

PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
FEB 16 '44

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

JANUARY 29, 1944

VOL. X, No. 240—PUBLICATION 2058

Contents

THE WAR	Page
Japanese Atrocities:	
Statement by the Secretary of State	115
Statement by Joseph C. Grew	115
Suspension of Oil Shipments to Spain	116
Soviet Reply to the United States Inquiry Regarding the Polish Declaration of January 14, 1944	116
Severance of Relations by Argentina With Germany and Japan	116
The Puppet Government in the Philippines	117
THE DEPARTMENT	
"The State Department Speaks"	117
AMERICAN REPUBLICS	
The United States and Panama: Article by Philip W. Bonsal	125
Non-Recognition of the Present Revolutionary Junta in Bolivia	132
Implementation of Existing Contracts on 1944 Cuban Sugar Crop	132
THE FOREIGN SERVICE	
Confirmations	132
Death of Edward Thomas Williams: Statement by the Secretary of State	132
GENERAL	
Dedication of the "International House" at New Orleans: Address by George S. Messersmith . . .	133

[OVER]



Contents—CONTINUED

TREATY INFORMATION	Page
Alaska Highway:	
Agreement With Canada ⁷ Regarding the Southern Terminus of the Highway	134
Agreement With Canada Authorizing the Construc- tion of Flight Strips Along the Highway.	135
Agreement With Canada Authorizing the Construc- tion of the Haines-Champagne Highway.	136
Agreement With Canada Regarding the Use of Con- necting Roads	136
Customs Privileges: Agreement With Canada Regard- ing Importation Privileges for Government Officials and Employees.	138
Telecommunications: Agreement With Canada Regard- ing the Construction and Operation of Radio Broadcasting Stations in Northwestern Canada	139
Water Power: Agreement With Canada for the Tempo- rary Raising of the Level of Lake St. Francis	142
LEGISLATION.	142
PUBLICATIONS	142

The War

JAPANESE ATROCITIES

Statement by the Secretary of State

At his press and radio news conference on January 28 the Secretary of State declared, in reply to an inquiry in regard to the Japanese mistreatment of American prisoners of war in the Far East:

"According to the reports of cruelty and inhumanity, it would be necessary to summon, to assemble together all the demons available from anywhere and combine the fiendishness which all of them embody in order to describe the conduct of those who inflicted these unthinkable tortures on Americans and Filipinos . . ."

The Secretary added in reply to other inquiries that the Department of State had been constantly endeavoring to obtain as complete information as possible with respect to the situation of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Far East, that whenever information regarding any case of cruelty had been received a protest had been made to the Japanese Government, but that the United States had not received from the Japanese Government satisfactory replies to the protests which had been made.

Statement by Joseph C. Grew¹

In response to an inquiry in regard to Japanese atrocities on American and Filipino soldiers in the Philippine Islands, Mr. Grew said:

"No language can possibly express my feelings and the feelings of every American today. Our burning rage and fury at the reported medieval and utterly barbarous acts of the Japanese military in the Philippines are far too deep to find

expression in words, and the country will be shaken from coast to coast. My broadcast over CBS on August 30, 1942 just after returning from Japan and my book *Report from Tokyo* tried to express my views then, and those views have now become intensified. My feelings make me, and I should think every other American this morning, want to fight this war on the home front with grimmer determination than ever before."

¹Mr. Grew, formerly American Ambassador to Japan, is now Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

SUSPENSION OF OIL SHIPMENTS TO SPAIN¹

[Released to the press January 28]

The loadings of Spanish tankers with petroleum products for Spain have been suspended through action of the State Department, pending a reconsideration of trade and general relations between Spain and the United States in the light of trends in Spanish policy. The Spanish Government has shown a certain reluctance to satisfy requests deemed both reasonable and important by the State Department and concerning which representations have continuously been addressed to the Spanish Government for some time past. Certain Italian warships and merchant vessels continue interned in Spanish ports; Spain continues to permit the export to Germany of certain vital war materials such as wolfram; Axis agents are active both in continental Spain and in Spanish African territory as well as in Tangier; some portion of the Blue Division appears still involved in the war against one of our allies; and reports have been received indicating the conclusion of a financial arrangement between the Spanish Government and Germany designed to make available to Germany substantial peseta credits which Germany unquestionably expects to apply to augmenting espionage and sabotage in Spanish territory and to intensifying opposition to us in the peninsula.

This action has been taken after consultation and agreement with the British Government.

SOVIET REPLY TO THE UNITED STATES INQUIRY REGARDING THE POLISH DECLARATION OF JANUARY 14, 1944

At his press and radio news conference on January 26 the Secretary of State declared that the Soviet Government had replied to the inquiry whether the good offices of the United

¹ See also BULLETIN of Mar. 6, 1943, p. 201, and of Mar. 13, 1943, p. 218.

States with a view to arranging for the initiation of discussions between the Polish and Soviet Governments looking to a resumption of official relations between them would be agreeable to the Soviet Government. He added that the Soviet Government, after expressing appreciation of the offer made by the United States, had stated that it felt that conditions had not yet reached the stage where such good offices could be utilized to advantage.

SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS BY ARGENTINA WITH GERMANY AND JAPAN

[Released to the press January 29]

A translation of a telegram which has been received by President Roosevelt from President Ramirez of Argentina follows:

BUENOS AIRES, January 26, 1944.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in the exercise of constitutional powers I have proceeded to sign the decree of breach of diplomatic relations with the Governments of Germany and Japan. While advising Your Excellency of this decision which the Argentine Government adopts for the protection not only of its sovereignty but also of continental defense, I repeat to you the assurances of the firm purpose that animates us of strengthening more and more the friendly relations which so happily have always existed between our two countries.

GENERAL PEDRO P. RAMIREZ

The following message has been sent by President Roosevelt to President Ramirez:

JANUARY 28, 1944.

I wish to express to Your Excellency my pleasure in learning of the decision of your Government to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. It is especially welcome to hear that Argentina has thus affirmed its intention to assist fully in the defense of the continent.

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

[Released to the press January 26]

At his press and radio news conference on January 26 the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"It will be most gratifying to all the Allied Nations, including especially the American republics, to learn that Argentina has broken diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. This action was taken because the Argentine Government realizes that the Axis countries are using Argentina as a vast operating base for espionage and other activities highly dangerous to the security and internal peace of the hemisphere. It must be assumed from her action that Argentina will now proceed energetically to adopt the other measures which all the American republics have concerted for the security of the continent."

THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

[Released to the press January 29]

The Department of State has received through official channels a denial of the allegations contained in a Japanese news agency report broadcast January 8. The enemy broadcast stated that the Holy See recognized the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

The Department has been informed that, consistent with the policy of refusing to accord recognition until after peace has been concluded to states and regimes which have arisen in the course and as the result of war, the Holy See has not recognized the Japanese puppet regime in the Philippines.

The Department

"THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS"

[Released to the press January 29]

The text of the fourth of a series of four broadcasts over the National Broadcasting Company entitled "The State Department Speaks", follows:

Participants

CORDELL HULL	Secretary of State
SAM RAYBURN	Speaker of the House of Representatives
TOM CONNALLY	United States Senator, Chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations of United States Senate
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG	United States Senator, Member of Committee on Foreign Relations of United States Senate
BRECKINRIDGE LONG	Assistant Secretary of State
RICHARD HARKNESS	Representing the public

WASHINGTON ANNOUNCER: For the American people, the National Broadcasting Company presents the fourth and last of a special series of programs called "The State Department Speaks". We take you now to the State Department Building on Pennsylvania Avenue here in Washington, D. C.

HARKNESS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Richard Harkness. Tonight, as your representative, I find myself in distinguished company indeed. Seated around this table in the Secretary of State's office are Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senators Tom Connally and Arthur H. Vandenberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. As you can judge from this list, our subject this evening is the important one of the relationship of Congress and the State Department in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy—the role played

in these processes by the elected representatives of the people in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Mr. Secretary, won't you say something on this subject?

HULL: From my long experience in both chambers of the Capitol, I know how rightly jealous the Congress is of its constitutional prerogatives, how properly insistent it is upon its full share in the making of foreign policy. I need not tell my three old friends and former colleagues, who are here with me tonight, nor the rest of the members of the House and the Senate, how conscious I am at all times of what I felt when I was located at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. For the past 11 years it has been my pleasure to meet with them often, individually or in groups, here in the Department or at the Capitol, to counsel together frankly and fully on questions concerning the well-being of our country.

Under our system of government, the safeguarding and promotion of the nation's interests is a joint responsibility of the Executive and the Legislature. Neither can be effective without the other, and the two together can be effective only when there exists between them mutual trust and confidence. In peace and in war, the two branches of the Government are joint trustees for the country's destiny.

All of us are facing today truly unprecedented war tasks.

In this struggle, the Executive and the Congress have one thought, and one only: To do everything that may be needed to bring the war to a victorious end as rapidly as possible. America stands today in the panoply of vast power dedicated solely and whole-heartedly to the utter defeat of our enemies. Dark days are still ahead, but there is in our hearts complete confidence that the unremitting efforts and heavy sacrifices of our heroic armed forces and of a nation united at home will bring us complete victory in this war for self-preservation from the forces of embattled evil.

Equally unprecedented tasks will confront our nation and its Government in the difficult

days that will follow the cessation of hostilities. In some ways, the post-war tasks will be scarcely less exacting than those which face us now.

Our supreme task in the future will be to make sure that all this does not happen again.

I firmly believe that this great goal is possible of attainment. To attain it, our nation and the other peace-loving nations must be firmly resolved never to permit differences between them to reach the point of armed conflict, but rather to adjust them by peaceful means. We and the other peace-loving nations must be equally resolved and prepared to use force if necessary—promptly, in adequate measure and with certainty—to prevent or repress acts of aggression by nations which may refuse to be peace-abiding members of the family of nations. Finally, we and the other peace-loving nations must be resolved to cooperate commercially and otherwise in order that there may be created, for all nations and all peoples, greater opportunities and better facilities for political, economic, and social advancement. Such cooperation is essential if there is to be any hope of eliminating the causes of international conflicts.

The Congress, by non-partisan action, and the Executive, through acts and utterances, have placed on record this country's determination that the supreme task of the future shall be successfully accomplished. All of us are acutely aware of the fact that behind this determination is the united will of our people. All of us know that we can be true to the trust reposed in us only if we find effective means of making sure that what is happening today does not happen again.

It is not enough for our nation alone to stand firmly behind the kind of program for peace-keeping that I have briefly described. The achievement of such a program requires united action by many nations. It must be our task to exert to that end every ounce of our influence.

This will require patience, and tolerance, and good-will, and readiness to play our full part, and every other attribute of enlightened leadership. There will be many difficulties to over-

come. They can be overcome if our people continue to see clearly that the price of failure is national disaster and if the Congress and the Executive continue to work together.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Secretary Hull. Now, I know that all of us, including yourself, will listen with great interest to what your distinguished friends have to say; and then maybe you'll be kind enough to come back to say another few words. And now, ladies and gentlemen, may I present the first of our guests from Capitol Hill—the respected and esteemed Speaker of the House of Representatives—for 30 years member of Congress for the fourth district of Texas—the Honorable Sam Rayburn.

RAYBURN: For over a century foreign policy was something which held comparatively little interest for most of the American people. Events of the past 30 years have changed this public indifference to intense and deep interest in our foreign affairs. Twice in that time we have poured our blood and our wealth into overseas wars in the defense of our security. Every day the morning paper tells us of some hitherto obscure part of the world where American fighting men—our relatives and friends—have landed and are in grips with the enemy.

We now know, and we must never again forget, that we are directly and vitally involved in world affairs; that henceforth foreign policy concerns not a few diplomats alone but the entire nation and all groups within the nation.

We are, and we intend to remain, a government of the people, and our foreign policy must therefore be backed by the will and convictions of the people.

HARKNESS: Mr. Speaker, as one who occupies the highest position of responsibility and honor in the House of Representatives, would you please give us your views on the role of the Congress in formulating and carrying out our foreign policy?

RAYBURN: If a successful foreign policy depends upon the continuous participation and support of the whole nation, the Congress as

elected representatives of the people has, indeed, an important part to play.

I should like to call to mind some of the actions taken by the Congress, in cooperation with the Executive, in the dark years from 1939 through 1941 to resist the aggressor's designs: The repeal of the arms embargo in 1939, the armament program and the Selective Service Act of 1940, the lend-lease legislation in 1941. These measures have all played an important part in forging the weapons which yesterday threw back and today are beating down our enemies. These all were major acts of foreign policy. They were, moreover, measures of foreign policy which under our form of government could only be undertaken and effectively applied through the cooperation of the Executive and both houses of the Congress.

HARKNESS: What about the future, Mr. Speaker?

RAYBURN: The Congress is now giving attention to the future problems of maintaining the peace and security for which we fight. A few months ago the House of Representatives, by an overwhelming and bipartisan majority, adopted the Fulbright resolution urging the participation of this country in international peace machinery. This striking declaration of the House of Representatives played its full part, I am sure, along with the Connally resolution of the Senate and the momentous Four-Nation Declaration adopted at the Moscow Conference, in making clear to the world that this nation stands united behind a foreign policy of effective international cooperation.

The Senate, of course, has its important constitutional function of giving its advice and consent to treaties regulating our relations with other countries. But the House of Representatives has a position in the field of foreign affairs which, perhaps, is not as well understood as it should be. The House, which is elected every 2 years, is uniquely representative of the opinions, the hopes and the fears of the American people in their home communities.

I have already mentioned some recent examples of major foreign-policy measures in which the House of Representatives participated by exercising its legislative powers. There are many others. For example, all tariff bills must originate in the House, and this has meant that such well-known foreign-economic-policy measures as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act are first considered in the House Committee on Ways and Means. Similarly, the Committee on Appropriations of the House maintains the closest touch with the Department of State and aspects of our foreign affairs. It is this Committee which determines in the first instance how much, and for what purposes funds are to be made available to the Department of State and other executive agencies doing foreign-affairs work. These are some of the less widely known phases of the House of Representatives part in the conduct of our foreign relations.

Best known to all is the work of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is this Committee which considered such measures as the repeal of the arms embargo, lend-lease, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Fulbright resolution, and other highly important matters of foreign policy.

In the coming months and years the United States will have many vital decisions to make on the nature of the arrangements which are to be established for the future maintenance of peace. If these arrangements are to be accepted, if we are to make them effective, they must represent the views and have the sustained support of the American people as a whole. The Congress of the United States—the elected representatives of the American people—will do its share, I am confident, in making the will of the American people effective in the promotion of international peace and well-being.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Speaker Rayburn. Now, I think we should try to get a little insight into the State Department's relations with Congress—from the man who handles that part

of the State Department's work—Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. I'm right on that, am I not, Mr. Long? You *are* in charge of congressional relations?

LONG: Yes, Mr. Harkness, I am. But I should add that this is an aspect of the Department's work which also receives a great deal of personal attention from the Secretary himself.

HARKNESS: Well, won't you go right ahead, Mr. Long—tell us—how close *are* the Department's relations with Congress?

LONG: Well, as a matter of practice the officers of the Department are continuously in touch with members of Congress in several ways. First is what might be termed routine business. This consists of matters their constituents are interested in as individuals, including every conceivable need for assistance affecting the interests of citizens abroad. Then, secondly, there are the matters of foreign policy in which the members of Congress have an official interest as legislators.

Also, there are the more formal relationships with the congressional committees. These are the most important phases of all the dealings between the Congress and the Department for, you see, the congressional committees make sure that proposed legislation which might have an effect upon our foreign relations is referred to the Secretary of State for an expression of views before any proposal is acted upon. These views are submitted by the Department generally in writing for the consideration of the particular congressional committee involved.

HARKNESS: I see; now, how about treaties?

LONG: With treaties the Department has a twofold experience. To begin with, the Department negotiates treaties. They are solemn obligations entered into by our Government with other governments and concern our sovereign rights as a nation. Once negotiated on behalf of the President, they are submitted by the President to the Senate. The Department's second phase then begins. We are then prepared, if requested, to meet with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and present

our views and information in support of the provisions of the proposed treaty. Sometimes this is a long procedure. An important treaty necessarily involves a lot of discussion.

HARKNESS: Yes, we all know that in years gone by a number of treaties have been bitterly contested in the Senate. What other contacts do you have with Congress, Mr. Long?

LONG: Well, I might mention those occasions when the officers of the Department discuss *informally* questions of foreign policy with the congressional committees having jurisdiction over foreign affairs.

HARKNESS: You say they discuss these questions *informally* with the congressional committees. What do you mean by that, Mr. Long?

LONG: By that I mean we have these discussions not in open hearings but in executive sessions of the committees with no stenographer present. As you know we can't always divulge publicly every aspect of our dealings with foreign governments during negotiations, but we well recognize that appropriate members of the Congress should be kept informed. To every practicable extent, we lay the cards on the table and tell the members of committees off the record the things which would be helpful to their understanding of a particular foreign policy. Under these circumstances we in the State Department have frequently appeared before Senator Connally's Committee on Foreign Relations, of which Senator Vandenberg is a member. Our associations with this committee are cordial, and I think the results have been very good.

HARKNESS: Mr. Long, I'd like to ask you this—you've served abroad as an ambassador and you're now representing the State Department in its relations with Congress. Which of these two jobs requires the most diplomatic talent?

LONG: Mr. Harkness, "diplomatic talent", as you express it, I think is mostly common sense, mixed up with ordinary courtesy, based on an

understanding of our country's national interest. Our dealings with members of the Congress are on that basis, and we find that they too have "diplomatic talent".

HARKNESS: That's a nice compliment to your congressional friends, Mr. Long. Thank you, Sir. Now let's hear from another legislator—the distinguished Republican Senator from Michigan, Arthur H. Vandenberg. Senator, as a minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, what are *your* views on the relationship of Congress and the State Department in the formulation and execution of foreign policy?

VANDEMBERG: The State Department and the Senate are in a constitutional partnership in many aspects of American foreign policy. No one needs to be historically reminded that the Senate has a direct veto on all treaties. They require a two-thirds Senate ratification; and failure of such ratification can and has changed the course of history.

In a broader sense the State Department and Congress as a whole—the House as well as the Senate—are in a constitutional partnership. For example, only the whole Congress, by majority vote in each branch, can declare war. Again, the House is particularly charged with control of the nation's purse strings—and appropriations are often vital to implement foreign policy (even though we have abandoned some of our old ideas of "dollar diplomacy").

It is perfectly obvious, on the face of the record, that there should be the closest possible relationship, therefore, and the fullest possible candor between the State Department and the Congress in general and the Senate in particular.

I realize that diplomacy cannot always function in a town meeting and that there are many delicate international negotiations which cannot always be broadcast even to 531 members of the Senate and the House, particularly in time of war. But I profoundly believe that national policy—a "people's foreign policy"—will be

surer and safer in proportion as these constitutional partners may draw closer together in the discharge of their mutual functions.

I am happy to join in congratulating Secretary Hull and Chairman Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the progress that has been made in this direction. Senator Connally has brought in many representatives of the State Department to give the Foreign Relations Committee first-hand confidential information regarding foreign situations during the past year. It has been most helpful. It is the working of a practical partnership. I am particularly happy that Assistant Secretary Long is here tonight. He has often represented the State Department upon these occasions; and he is one of our favorite visitors.

HARKNESS: Have you any concrete example, Senator, of the tangible value of these closer relationships?

VANDENBERG: Yes. The usefulness of this liaison is perhaps best illustrated by the recent history of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement between the United States and 43 foreign powers. At first it was proposed to promulgate this as a simple executive agreement. The Senate promptly—and rightly—rose up on its high horse and said it was a treaty which had to be ratified by the Senate. Instead of fighting out this sterile deadlock, a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee sat down with representatives of the State Department; in mutual contacts they re-wrote the agreement to satisfy the Senate it was no longer in the treaty class; it is now being submitted to both branches of Congress as part of a joint resolution of authority for appropriations. We are pulling together instead of pulling apart. That's a fine sample of the partnership cooperation which our "foreign policy" requires.

HARKNESS: Yes, I agree, Sir.

VANDENBERG: I would be less than frank, however, if I did not say that there is still much progress needed in this direction. After carefully studying the State Department's so-called

"White Paper"—detailing our relations with Tokyo for 11 months preceding Pearl Harbor—I am bound to say that neither Congress nor the country, nor the Senate Foreign Relations Committee itself, had the remotest information or idea about the *realities* that were sweeping us toward inevitable war. Congress cannot legislate intelligently in any such vacuum. I am sure Pearl Harbor wasn't one tenth as much of a surprise to the President and the State Department as it was to the House and Senate and the country. I hasten to repeat that I fully understand that many of these subsequent disclosures could not have been made before. But I also repeat that the nearer we can approach more complete information and understanding among the constitutional partners who must deal with "foreign policy" the safer our course will be.

I commend the State Department's praiseworthy efforts in this vital direction. The need will infinitely multiply as we approach the peace settlements of this world war. I hope and pray for a community of interest and action, regardless of politics, which will best serve America and stabilized civilization everywhere. Meanwhile, please let me toss an orchid to Secretary Hull, who is one of the truly great characters in modern statesmanship.

HARKNESS: All right, Senator Vandenberg—thank you, Sir. Now, let's hear from one of the best-known men on Capitol Hill—the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—Senator Tom Connally of Texas.

CONNALLY: The most important fact about our being met together here tonight in the Department of State is that it is *not* an unusual meeting. If there were something unusual about members of the Congress meeting with the Secretary of State for discussion of our foreign affairs our nation would, indeed, be in a peculiar state.

The integrity of our form of government rests upon the separation of the legislative and the executive powers. But the welfare of our country demands the intelligent cooperation of

these two coordinate and independent branches of our Government. While their functions are independent, yet their objectives are the common good, and cooperation to that end is appropriate.

Let our people always remember that an ineffective government is only less undesirable than a tyrannical government. Tyranny is to be abhorred, but history teaches that tyranny goads a frantic people to freedom. Ineffective government on the other hand not infrequently invites the tyranny of *either* the demagogue or the conqueror.

HARKNESS: Senator Connally, it seems to me that what you've just said is the story of much of Europe during the past 10 years or so.

CONNALLY: I firmly believe it.

HARKNESS: Well, do you feel, Sir, that we've had effective cooperation between the Congress and the Executive in the handling of our foreign affairs?

CONNALLY: If you mean, Mr. Harkness, have we had such cooperation throughout our history I would say that, with the exception of several tragic failures, we have generally had reasonable cooperation between the Congress and the Executive. It was this effective cooperation within our Government that has made it possible for our country to play an effective part in the common cause of the United Nations. Our task, our cause, today is the utter defeat of the Axis. Beyond that is our common ultimate goal—the establishment throughout the world of a just and enduring peace.

Let's make no mistake about it. Neither task will be easy. It will not be easy to bring our enemies to their knees. The blood and treasure which are yet to be poured out in this cause cannot be measured. But we are committed and determined to see it through.

HARKNESS: That's the way we all feel about it, Senator Connally, but where do we stand in your opinion concerning the ultimate task of making sure, as Secretary Hull just put it, "that all this does not happen again"?

CONNALLY: Well, as I just remarked, Mr. Harkness, this also will not be an easy task. But, Heaven forbid any man should ever say that the sublime objective of world peace is impossible! It is not impossible. And it is worth a sublime effort.

Senator Vandenberg has mentioned the constitutional responsibilities of the Senate in the approval of treaties. He has been most gracious in his references to my part in bringing representatives of the State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee together for valuable exchanges of views and information on the foreign situation. Let me say that, heavy as are the tasks of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they will be borne cheerfully as long as the burden can be shared with colleagues who in this work, regardless of party, have no other interest than the best interest of our country. No member of our committee has approached our common tasks with a greater spirit of helpfulness and national service than has Senator Vandenberg.

Last fall, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I presented to the Senate on behalf of the committee a resolution designed to make clear the intention of the Senate that this country should cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace and that the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, should join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world. After thorough discussion on the floor of the Senate, the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming vote.

The Senate of the United States has thereby announced to the world its determination that we intend to participate with other peace-seeking nations to keep the peace which we now fight to gain.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Senator Connally. And now back to Secretary Hull.

Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would comment on Senator Vandenberg's statement that

neither the Congress nor the country had the remotest information or idea about the realities that were sweeping us toward war. I noticed he also said that he fully understood that many of the subsequent disclosures—such as were made in the State Department's "White Paper"—could not have been made before.

HULL: Senator Vandenberg is a very old friend, and I am always interested in what he has to say. I fully agree with his statement that many of the disclosures subsequently made could not be made before without jeopardizing our national safety. But we certainly disagree on his first statement. My view is this: The tragedy of our pre-Pearl-Harbor situation lay not in lack of warning as to the steadily approaching dangers to this hemisphere and this country. The President and I and other responsible officials did everything we could by utterance and acts to make clear and emphasize these growing dangers.

If these repeated warnings failed to impress some of our people, I can only explain such failure by the fact that, during that period, too many of our people profoundly believed that no serious danger from foreign wars did or could threaten this country and that about all the nation had to do to keep out of war was to stay at home and mind its own business. It was as impossible to convince these people against this profound conviction they entertained at the time as it would have been to convince them against any other profound belief held by them.

I am sure that we are all now agreed that in this experience lies our greatest lesson for the future. Speaker Rayburn, Senator Connally, Senator Vandenberg, and I are in complete agreement that effective cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government and unflagging alertness on the part of our people to dangers as they threaten are all indispensable to our national safety and well-being.

Before this final program ends, I should like to say a few words of appreciation for the courtesy of the National Broadcasting Company in arranging, through this series, for my associates and myself to speak to the people of this

country on matters of such grave concern to all of us. I want to compliment Mr. Harkness for his conduct of the programs. I am deeply grateful to Speaker Rayburn and to Senators Connally and Vandenberg for their contribution to the discussion this evening.

I sincerely hope that these programs will have helped the American people to a better understanding of what our foreign policy is about and of how it is conducted. There is no greater danger confronting a democracy in the conduct of its foreign affairs than indifference on the part of the people to the great issues at stake and the resulting absence of clear thinking and constructive criticism. The first duty of responsible American citizenship is enlightened interest in public affairs, both domestic and foreign, and constant alertness to every manifestation of danger.

HARKNESS: Thank you once again, Secretary Hull, and thanks also to our other distinguished guests, Speaker Rayburn, Senators Connally and Vandenberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long.

As all of you know, this is the last of this special limited series of programs arranged for broadcast by the NBC University of the Air to reveal to the American people something of the work, procedure, and policies of our Department of State. Judging by our mailbox, the series has been most successful. And to all of you Americans who listened each week with such keen interest, to the many who wrote us letters of praise and constructive criticism, I want to say for NBC and the State Department—thanks a million. It's a real pleasure to serve you. Now—this is Richard Harkness saying "Good night" from Washington.

WASHINGTON ANNOUNCER: Good night, Richard Harkness. Ladies and gentlemen, we have just concluded the last of four programs broadcast as a public service under the title "The State Department Speaks". These four programs will be published in booklet form and you may have a copy free of charge by writing to "The State Department Speaks" in care of NBC, New York. But to be sure of your copy you must write at once.

American Republics

THE UNITED STATES AND PANAMA

*By Philip W. Bonsal*¹

I

Panama is the newest of the American republics; it is also the smallest from the point of view of population. The country's area is about that of the State of Maine; the people number about half a million. Yet the Republic, through its history and its present-day institutions and characteristics, has demonstrated that its people deservedly enjoy the rights of nationhood. History, geography, and economics have conspired to place the citizens of Panama and of the United States on the Isthmus in peculiarly close contact.

The Canal Zone, which frames the Canal, is a 10-mile-wide strip, bisecting the Republic (except where the nation's two principal cities, Panamá and Colón, form virtual enclaves in the Zone). The boundary between the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama in the terminal areas at either end of the Canal consists of city streets. Panamá and Balboa, Colón and Cristóbal, though they fly different flags, are urban units. The Canal itself is the most valuable single economic and military asset of the United States. Its importance in time of war as well as in time of peace cannot be exaggerated. Therefore, the relations between Panama and the United States afford a peculiarly significant demonstration of the success or failure of the patterns for international living adopted by the two nations as members of the community of American republics.

When, on May 3 of 1943, President Roosevelt signed a joint resolution passed by the House and Senate authorizing the performance of cer-

tain commitments entered into by the executive branch of our Government with the Republic of Panama,² he formalized the final step in a 10-year process in which the two countries may find justified satisfaction and pride. Thanks to prolonged, but frank and good-tempered, negotiation and with the approval of the duly elected representatives of the two peoples, the policy of the good neighbor has been given full expression in solemn covenants and in other arrangements governing the relations of Panama and the United States.

II

When in 1903 Panama became independent, and thus achieved an aspiration actively cherished by many Isthmian citizens since the overthrow of Spanish power 80 years before, the new republic promptly entered into that treaty relationship with the United States which made possible the construction of the Canal.³ That treaty, signed two weeks after the birth of the republic, governed the dealings of the two countries during the heroic days of the building of the Canal, through the first World War, and on to the very eve of the present conflict.

In passing upon the terms of the document signed by John Hay and Philippe Bunau-Varilla it is necessary to bear in mind the respective situations of the parties. Panama had just won her independence. Neither her citizens nor those of the former sovereign of the territory had as yet achieved any outstanding record for civil stability. As a matter of fact, Colombia was emerging more or less exhausted

¹ The author of this article is the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs of the Department of State.

² 57 Stat. 74.

³ Convention of Nov. 18, 1903, Treaty Series 431.

from the last of the great civil struggles in the course of which her admirable democratic structure was forged. The Panamanians had not yet created, much less tested, the constitutional institutions upon which the domestic peace and prosperity of the new nation were to depend.

. On the other hand, the United States was a novice in inter-American affairs, as well as in any real degree of participation in international affairs on a world-wide scale. The frontier as a focus for the national energies was only beginning to lose its place. The people were drawing breath and looking at the world beyond their borders. The enterprise of the construction of the Canal fired the imaginations and enlisted the devotion of those who had freed Cuba and cherished a vision of the place the United States might assume in world affairs during the dawning century. The first steps in the assumption of that place were necessarily without the benefit of experience, although they made up in vigor what they lacked in careful direction. In fact, the decade which began with 1898 witnessed a complete transformation in the international outlook of the United States through the assumption of international responsibilities.

The construction of the Canal, therefore, involved the reaching of an agreement between a powerful, growing nation in which the imperialists were in full control of foreign policy, on the one hand, and, on the other, a small new nation with entirely different traditions, institutions, and language. The resulting agreement was the convention of 1903. Viewed in its proper setting and considered in the light of the political principles of the times it cannot be considered ungenerous. It was realistic. Its provisions for the health and sanitation of the Canal, of the terminal cities, and of the adjacent areas, recognized one of the principal factors, if not the principal factor, in the failure of the French Canal Company and assured to the United States powers sufficient to eliminate that factor. The wisdom of these provisions cannot be questioned. They were essential to the success of the entire enterprise, and the Panamanians had more, if possible, to gain from them than did the United States.

However, from the political point of view, the treaty was onerous from the beginning and became more so to a people aspiring to integral sovereignty. The very first article stated that "The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama." With the recollection of recent civil disturbances fresh in their minds, the American negotiators insisted that the United States should have the right to intervene at any time "for the maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order." Intervention was to be undertaken purely in our discretion, without discussion or even an appeal for assistance from the Panamanian Government.

The treaty also gave us the right, should we consider it desirable for the purpose of the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the Canal, to take Panamanian land and water areas located outside the Canal area without consulting the Panamanian Government. The existence of this right, and particularly the provision that it could be exercised at our initiative alone, was considered—and rightly considered—by Panamanians to be a constant threat to their territorial integrity.

It is obviously beyond the scope of this article to trace in detail the relations between the two countries as they were affected by the exercise of the two treaty rights described above. That task has already been ably performed, notably by Dr. William David McCain, now archivist of the State of Mississippi, in his concise, scholarly volume entitled *The United States and the Republic of Panama*. Yet the exercise of those rights brought home to the two parties certain truths and illustrated certain lessons in international relations which must be emphasized.

The right to maintain public order in the principal cities of the Republic was inserted in the treaty on behalf of the United States for the purpose of protecting the Canal and the installations in the Canal Zone from the possible effects of armed violence, whether by organ-

ized military elements or by mobs from the Republic. It may also have been thought that, even though such violence did not extend to the territory of the Zone, the consequent disruption of normal activity in the Republic could not but be prejudicial to Canal interests. In practice, however, these fears proved to be largely unfounded. The institutions of the Republic were consolidated without great turmoil; militarism never became a factor in local politics. The United States did intervene from time to time. Yet, due to the increasing prosperity and enlightenment of the citizens of the Republic, the original cause for the assertion of this right on behalf of the United States soon ceased to exist to any really important or predictable extent.

It is, of course, true that the right was also exercised from time to time to remedy conditions arising from the presence in the cities of the Republic of persons from the Canal Zone, both members of the armed forces and Canal employees and laborers. The resulting difficulties, particularly in times of congestion on the Isthmus as during the last war, strained the law-enforcement agency of the Republic. Yet the eventual remedy was found not in intervention by the United States but rather in a growing realization on the part of the Panama authorities of the importance of the maintenance of orderly conditions in the areas of Panamá and Colón frequented by visitors.

It is a fair conclusion that the dangers which were to have been warded off through the exercise of the right of intervention have proved to be in fact non-existent. Yet that right did impose upon the United States a heavy obligation and upon the citizens of the Republic a serious handicap in the development of their political institutions. From the very early days our representatives on the Isthmus considered the maintenance of orderly, stable government in the Republic to be one of their principal duties. In other words, they undertook to pass upon the relative merits of the "ins" and the "outs" and to use the threat of intervention to maintain "constitutional" order. It cannot be questioned that this type of paternalism was

often—perhaps regularly—exercised from the sincerest and most high-minded motives. Nevertheless, the end result was stultifying to the civic progress of the Republic.

Political responsibility in Panama became lodged in the Legation of the United States—not in the voices and the actions of the citizenry. The relative merits of the contending parties were sometimes argued with more warmth before the American Minister than before the electorate. The party in power relied upon the American Minister as its staunchest support in internal affairs. The leaders of the "outs" devoted a large part of their energies and of their eloquence to denouncing in Washington the sins of the party ruling in Panama. Every act of the Minister and of the Department of State affecting Panama was interpreted in terms of local politics. The civic virtues of combativeness and aggressiveness in support of honestly held principles must indeed be hardy growths to flourish, when it is generally believed that responsibility for—and certainly power over—local political conditions is lodged in the representative of a foreign government enjoying, at his own discretion, a right of armed intervention.

Equally burdensome to the Panamanians was the right reserved to the United States to seize lands and waters additional to those comprised in the Canal Zone for Canal purposes. While the lands actually added to the Zone after 1903 were undoubtedly needed for purposes clearly related to the Canal, the very existence of this right, exercisable at our will and without recourse, was a permanent menace not only to the integrity of the nation but also to the undisturbed enjoyment of their private property by its citizens. One case, that of Taboga Island, will illustrate the feeling of helpless insecurity and bitterness engendered by this provision of the treaty of 1903.

Taboga is an island with an area of about two square miles located in the Bay of Panama. It is beautiful and healthful; it has a small resident population and, in addition, has long been a health and vacation resort for the inhabitants of the capital of the Republic.

On November 14, 1918, three days after the Armistice, marking the complete victory of the Allied and Associated Powers, the United States notified Panama, a faithful ally in the late struggle, that the greater part of Taboga Island would be taken over for defense purposes. This wholly arbitrary and ill-considered action caused a tremendous wave of indignation. A formal protest was sent to the Department of State; after 20 days the protest was rejected, and the rejection was later reiterated. In January 1919, however, the Panamanian Government was informed that the United States would not take possession at once and was "anxious to adopt a liberal policy" with regard to the inhabitants. It is hard to see how this can have been any great relief to the people concerned. Finally, in June of 1920, over a year and one half after the original notification, our authorities decided that, instead of the 1,160 acres they had originally stated to be necessary for the defense of the Canal, some 37 acres would be sufficient!

Perhaps exaggeratedly, but nevertheless understandably, Panamanians entertained the view that the existence of this right might at any time result in the extinction of the Republic as a separate territorial entity, should the United States determine that the whole Isthmus was needed for the construction, operation, maintenance, and protection of the Canal.

III

There is no evidence that any responsible Panamanian at any time desired to impede the operation or the protection of the Canal. Generally speaking, the citizens of Panama have demonstrated—and this was true in the last war and not less so today—a thorough conviction of the identity of interest of Panama and the United States in international affairs. Their objection has been to the taking of measures to promote that interest by the United States on Panamanian soil without any recognition of the inherent right of Panama as a sovereign nation to participate in the formulation and carrying out of such measures.

The existence of a community of interest between the two countries—and more particularly a growing recognition of the fact that Panama was ready and able actively to further that interest—resulted finally in agreement on a re-statement of the terms of the relationship. An abortive attempt in that direction had been made as early as 1926. Shortly after his inauguration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the then President of Panama issued a statement to the effect that they intended to initiate negotiations for a convention to place the relations between the two countries on a new footing. These negotiations began late in 1934 and culminated on March 2, 1936, after more or less constant discussions between the parties, in the signature of a new treaty.¹ The Senate of the United States, however, delayed three years before giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the document.

Fundamentally, the new treaty was based upon the willingness of the two Governments "to cooperate, as far as it is feasible for them to do so, for the purpose of insuring the full and perpetual enjoyment of the benefits of all kinds which the Canal should afford the two nations that made possible its construction as well as all nations interested in world trade". That cooperation was to lead to the taking of measures designed to "insure the maintenance, sanitation, efficient operation and effective protection of the Canal, *in which the two countries are jointly and vitally interested*" [italics supplied]. Thus, Panama became a partner in the Canal enterprise in its largest sense instead of a more or less passive beneficiary in some respects and a victim in other respects of the bisection of Panamanian territory by the Canal Zone.

Under the new treaty the guaranty of the maintenance of Panamanian independence by the United States was superseded by the establishment of normal relations of peace and friendship such as then prevailed between the United States and the rest of the world. The right of the United States to intervene for the purpose of maintaining order in Panama was

¹ Treaty Series 945.

abolished. Likewise, the right of the United States to take additional lands and waters in Panamanian territory was replaced by a provision which stated, in effect, that, while the two Governments did not anticipate the necessity for the taking of additional lands for Canal purposes, nevertheless, the two Governments recognized "their joint obligation to insure the effective and continuous operation of the Canal and the preservation of its neutrality, and consequently, if, in the event of some now unforeseen contingency, the utilization of lands or waters additional to those already employed should be in fact necessary for the maintenance, sanitation or efficient operation of the Canal, or for its effective protection, the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama will agree upon such measures as it may be necessary to take in order to insure the maintenance, sanitation, efficient operation and effective protection of the Canal, in which the two countries are jointly and vitally interested".

The new treaty further provided that "In case of an international conflagration or the existence of any threat of aggression which would endanger the security of the Republic of Panama or the neutrality or security of the Panama Canal", the two Governments would take appropriate measures together and would also consult together regarding measures which one of the two Governments might feel it essential to take but which would affect the territory of the other Government concerned.

The principal reason for which this treaty was delayed for over 3 years in our Senate was unquestionably the existence of doubt in the minds of certain Senators as to whether the new treaty would adequately protect our major interests in the Canal area. It was only after a clarifying exchange of notes between the Department of State and the Panamanian Embassy in Washington, early in 1939, that these doubts were removed.¹ The Panamanian Government stated that, in cases of extreme urgency,

consultation between the two Governments as to desirable measures might occur after rather than before the taking of necessary measures of defense by one Government which would affect the territory of the other. This interpretation was an obviously essential one in view of the nature of modern warfare and the record of international lawlessness of the aggressor nations.

IV

The relationship established by the new treaty was soon brought to the test. As it became more and more certain that the Axis powers had designs involving ruthless and complete world conquest, our military and naval authorities were forced to the conclusion that the defense of the Canal could no longer be insured by installations located in the Canal Zone. A plan of defense was drawn up which involved the occupation of a very large number of points in Panamanian territory for airfields, gun emplacements, searchlight locations, detector stations, etc. This plan was submitted to and discussed with the Panamanian Government, the Chief Executive of which held highly nationalistic views, and was accused in some quarters of being sympathetic to the Fascist ideology. Nevertheless, the President of Panama in March of 1941 indicated his willingness to make available to the United States the needed defense sites.² In view of the emergency situation with which the two Governments were confronted, it was agreed that the sites themselves would be turned over prior to the conclusion of the agreement covering their use.³ As a matter of fact, when that agreement was finally signed, our armed forces had already for over a year been in possession of several dozen of these sites. The outbreak of war found the Canal, thanks to the joint action of the two Governments, strongly protected.

The feeling of mutual trust and confidence between Panama and the United States was

¹ Treaty Series 945, p. 63.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 8, 1941, p. 265.

³ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1942, p. 448.

very much heightened by the willingness and expedition with which Panama carried out her treaty obligations. These obligations were not a light burden. They involved the throwing open of practically the entire country to our armed forces. Not only were the troops and the military equipment and installations of a foreign country located at a large number of points throughout the Republic, but the roads of Panama were crowded with the movements of our men; the sky over the territory of the nation was at all times crossed and recrossed by our combat planes.

Then came December 7, 1941. The hours immediately after the bombs of treachery fell on Pearl Harbor were a time of test and trial when the souls of men and nations in this hemisphere stood revealed by their spontaneous unreflected acts. The Government and people of Panama moved swiftly to perfect the defenses of their country threatened by the common aggressor. Several hundred Axis nationals, including many Japanese, were promptly rounded up and immobilized. War was declared on the three Axis powers with all possible expedition. Other security measures were taken including the closest possible cooperation with United States Army authorities in blackouts and other precautionary steps. In spite of the imminent danger of attack, there was no panic, no demand for special protection which might have detracted from the necessities of the military situation.

It is hard to exaggerate the significance of the enthusiastic actions and attitudes not only of the Government but of the people of Panama in support of the joint war effort. It was the help of ardent partners in a common enterprise. It is not necessary, in order to stress the meaning of this situation, to suppose one in which the half-million inhabitants of the Republic and their Government were frankly hostile to the power controlling and guarding the 50-miles-long by 10-miles-wide area enclosing the Canal. It is sufficient to imagine a situation in which the Government and people of the Isthmian nation had attitudes ranging from

indifference to sullen resentment at the continued assertion by the United States of such rights as were included in the treaty of 1903 and relinquished in that of 1936. The under-cover agents of our enemies would obviously under those conditions have had a fertile field in which to work. Today, those agents, if any remain at large, are held in check by the energy and alertness displayed by the authorities and the people on either side of the Canal on behalf of the cause which Panama, as one of the United Nations, considers her own.

V

Panama's behavior, both during the uneasy months following the outbreak of war in Europe in the late summer of 1939 and after December 1941 when each day dawned with the threat of attack, proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the proponents of the treaty of 1936 were right both theoretically and practically. Those who had feared that the relinquishment of the two rights contained in the treaty of 1903, namely, the right of the United States to intervene in Panama for the maintenance of order and the right of the United States to take further lands for Canal purposes without consulting the Republic, would weaken the defenses of the Canal in case of emergency were shown to have been completely wrong. Panama has been an active, aggressive ally. Her hearty cooperation has bulwarked the safety of the Canal to a degree which unilateral action by the United States could never have achieved.

Under these conditions, the Foreign Office of Panama raised and the Department of State gave consideration to two situations the continuance of which appeared to the people of Panama inconsistent with the relationship which the two Governments had wished to establish. In the first place, the United States had built and was to own and operate until 1957 the waterworks and sewerage systems in Panamá and Colón. The citizens and other residents of the Republic paid to employees of this Government amounts for water consumed in accordance with rates fixed by this Government.

These rates were designed to amortize the investment involved by 1957.

Secondly, the Panama Railroad Company, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States enjoyed the use of valuable real estate in Panamá and Colón which it rented for private business and residential purposes to persons largely citizens of Panama who had erected improvements thereon. These lands had an appraised value in excess of \$11,000,000. However, they had cost the railroad company only a very insignificant sum. In fact, the bulk of them, comprising the business center of Colón, the Republic's second city, had been granted to the company, then a privately owned corporation, by the Republic of Colombia in a series of concessions the last of which was dated 1867 for a period expiring in 1966, at which time the land was to revert to Colombia, the then-sovereign of the territory. In 1903, Panama gained her independence and succeeded to the sovereign rights of Colombia. By the treaty with the United States of that same year, the new Republic granted to the United States the reversionary right to the lands, the use of which was enjoyed by the Panama Railroad Company, both then and now wholly owned by our Government.

Thus many citizens of the Republic were paying ground rent fixed by one agency of the Government of the United States and water rates fixed by another agency of that same Government. The continued existence of this situation was obviously irksome to these citizens and to the Government and people of the nation. After careful discussion of the two matters, agreement was reached, subject to the approval of the Congress of the United States, whereby the waterworks and sewers were to be turned over to Panama at once instead of waiting until 1957 and the real estate described above was to be transferred to Panama without compensation.¹ In the course of the hearings held by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House

and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, it was clearly set forth that in connection with the waterworks transfer, full protection of health and sanitation conditions was contemplated. It was also brought out that in the case of the real estate, Panama would receive only lots which the Secretary of War had determined were not needed for the operation of the railroad or for Canal purposes. The railroad will continue to enjoy the use of land in the territory of the Republic necessary for those purposes in which, in the words of the treaty of 1936, "the two countries are jointly and vitally interested".

It was also emphasized at these hearings that, in the cheerful and prompt execution of her treaty obligations for the defense of the Canal, Panama had not demanded, as a condition precedent, the agreement regarding the waterworks and the real estate described above. In fact, the defense sites had been occupied by the armed forces of the United States over a year before these matters were settled as between the two Governments and over two years before that settlement was ratified by the Congress of the United States.

In the course of the discussion of this legislation, its opponents made the statement that friendship cannot be bought. With that statement, as a general proposition, there can be no quarrel. As between nations, and in the absence of grave emergencies such as the devastation of war or of natural calamities, a settled policy of hand-outs debauches both the giver and the receiver. On the other hand, the rectification of situations no longer consistent with new principles of national policy and the satisfaction of legitimate aspirations have produced, in the case of the relations of Panama and the United States, the highest moral and material benefits.

These two countries may, without exaggeration, claim to have given the world a demonstration of the relations which can and should prevail between a power, which, in the face of the political and economic realities of today, will long be burdened with world responsibilities and a small nation the territory of which em-

¹ The Congress authorized such action in Public Law 48, 78th Cong.; 57 Stat. 74.

braces one of the chief instruments for the carrying out of those responsibilities. Not only have Panama and the United States eliminated force as a factor in their relations, they have banished the temptation to the use of force and the fear of its use from the consideration of the many questions which their geographic proximity and their joint and vital interest in the functioning of the Canal must continue to present.

NON-RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA IN BOLIVIA

[Released to the press January 24]

This Government has been aware that subversive groups hostile to the Allied cause have been plotting disturbances against the American Governments operating in defense of the hemisphere against Axis aggression.

On December 20, 1943 the Bolivian Government was overthrown by force under circumstances linking this action with the subversive groups mentioned in the preceding statement.

The most important and urgent question arising from this development in Bolivia is the fact that this is but one act committed by a general subversive movement having for its purpose steadily expanding activities on the continent. These developments, viewed in the light of the information the American republics have been exchanging among themselves, dispose negatively of the matter of this Government's recognizing the present revolutionary Junta at La Paz.

The inter-American system built up over the past 10 years has had for one of its purposes the defending of the sovereign republics of the hemisphere against aggression or intervention in their domestic affairs by influences operating outside the hemisphere and outside their individual frontiers. This Government is confident that the freedom-loving people of the American republics, including those of Bolivia, who have the good-will of the Government and people of the United States, will understand that this de-

cision is taken in furtherance of the aforesaid purpose.

IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS ON 1944 CUBAN SUGAR CROP

[Released to the press January 28]

A United States delegation, representing various Government agencies and headed by Sidney H. Scheuer, Executive Director of the Bureau of Supplies, Foreign Economic Administration, will leave for Habana at the end of this week to continue discussions with representatives of the Cuban Government on remaining phases of purchase agreements for the 1944 Cuban sugar crop and the acquisition by the United States of molasses and alcohol.¹ The discussions will be concerned primarily with blackstrap molasses and alcohol phases of 1944 crop disposition. Representatives of the two Governments expect to reach mutually satisfactory agreements in the interests of both countries and the joint war effort.

The Foreign Service

CONFIRMATIONS

On January 28, 1944 the Senate confirmed the nomination of John Campbell White to be American Ambassador to Peru.

DEATH OF EDWARD THOMAS WILLIAMS

Statement by the Secretary of State

[Released to the press January 29]

We in the Department have learned with great regret of the death of Mr. Edward Thomas Williams, who was connected with the Foreign Service and the Department for many years and who was an outstanding authority on China and Chinese subjects. Mr. Williams

¹ See the BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1944, p. 40.

served as Secretary of Legation at Peking and was Chargé d'Affaires there at the time when our Government recognized the Chinese Republic in 1911. He later became Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department. After retirement he was called back to serve his Government in 1918-19 as technical delegate to the Peace Conference at Paris and again in 1921-22 as a special assistant of the Department for the Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

In all his assignments Mr. Williams rendered to his Government service of an outstanding character and contributed much to the promotion of closer relations between the people of the United States and peoples of the Far East. Possessing a quiet sense of humor and an extraordinary capacity for making friends, Mr. Williams enjoyed the high esteem of a large circle of associates for his integrity, his warmth of personality, and his scholarly attainments. His loss will be deeply mourned by all who had the privilege of knowing him.

General

DEDICATION OF THE "INTERNATIONAL HOUSE" AT NEW ORLEANS

Address by George S. Messersmith¹

[Released to the press January 28]

New Orleans, as gateway to the South and the terminal of sea routes connecting this country with Mexico and other republics of Central and South America, is indeed an appropriate city to establish an international club dedicated to the furtherance of good relations between our own citizens and those of foreign countries. The aim of New Orleans' "International House" to interpret American friendliness to visitors from other countries and to add a measure of welcome to the traditional hospitality of our people is in line with the steady efforts of the American Government to help to build, with the other nations of this hemisphere, democratic communities in which freedom and the benefits of enlightened civilization may be common to all.

It is fitting that the statesmanship of our President and Secretary of State and the leadership and responsive collaboration which statesmen in the other American republics have vouchsafed in the cause of hemispheric solidar-

ity should inspire among our citizens and business leaders zeal and determination to cooperate in the great work of advancing good international relations. Those relations can best be fostered by cherishing a genuine patriotism and love of country together with high civic pride that expresses itself in generous and helpful acts, particularly on behalf of the stranger whose lasting impressions are gathered not so much from the magnificence and evidences of well-being displayed before him as from the kindness and courtesy of the people among whom he has come to sojourn.

Business and social intercourse among the citizens of different countries is a closer bond than that attained by the making of most solemn treaties. Declarations and treaties are binding upon governments which have made them and serve to further the collective common aim; but that aim is strengthened and implemented by the friendly relations established among the people themselves.

There has been no time in our history when our attitude toward our neighbors and their

¹ Delivered in Washington over the Columbia Broadcasting System, Jan. 28, 1944. Mr. Messersmith is the American Ambassador to Mexico.

attitude toward us mean so much. What is our cause has indeed become the cause of the whole civilized world; and the friends beyond our shores who are laboring with us to preserve our freedom and theirs may expect a hearty and cordial welcome when they come to visit us.

The city of New Orleans, which is the gateway of the great Mississippi Valley, has a long history of achievement in the development of our national life; and this project of making available to travelers from foreign countries a center known as "International House" is another forward step in the leadership and enterprise of that great city. From undertakings such as this, which has been planned to promote a closer relation with our neighbors, numerous mutual advantages will be obtained, not only in connection with commerce and the interchange of goods but also in the wide scope of educational, cultural, and social developments, which have so great a diversity among other nations as well as our own.

Probably the outstanding result of the present world conflict will be to awaken in the minds of people all over the world a consciousness of the degree to which one nation is dependent for its welfare, happiness, and security on others who have put forth efforts in the common fight to preserve the same ideals and aspira-

tions. When by our mutual effort we shall have preserved freedom and the institutions which we cherish, it is natural that we shall seek closer ties with the friends in other countries who have joined us in the struggle and who will build with us in the peace.

Besides it is a proof of growing enlightenment among our people with respect to world affairs that a great community like New Orleans, conscious of its obligations to further the international relations and foreign policy of its Government, takes steps in a very positive way to bring that about, by uniting its representative fellow citizens in a program of promoting the well-being and prosperity of our neighbors as well as of our own country.

When we speak of the United Nations engaged in the greatest conflict the world has ever known, let us not forget the millions of individuals in the midst of battles and at home who compose the invincible strength by which we shall win. Upon those same individuals of many nationalities, creeds, and tongues finally depends a stable and lasting world peace. This can be achieved by a universal effort to promote international good-will and friendship. It is indeed gratifying that the citizens of New Orleans and the Mississippi Valley in establishing "International House" are endeavoring to help bring this about.

Treaty Information

ALASKA HIGHWAY

Agreement With Canada Regarding the Southern Terminus of the Highway¹

The following notes were exchanged by the American Minister to Canada and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs:

No. 668

OTTAWA, CANADA,
May 4, 1942.

SIR:

During the course of a conversation on April 24, 1942, Mr. Keenleyside, Assistant Under Sec-

retary of State for External Affairs, raised the question of the southern terminus of the Alaska Highway now under construction, and inquired in particular if my Government felt that the stretch of road between railhead at Dawson Creek and Fort St. John fell within the terms of the American offer as contained in my note of March 17, 1942.²

The wording of the pertinent recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which was incorporated in my note of March 17th, dealt with "the construction of a highway

¹To be printed in the Executive Agreement Series.

²Executive Agreement Series 246.

along the route that follows the general line of airports, Fort St. John - Fort Nelson - Watson Lake - Whitehorse - Boundary - Big Delta, the respective termini connecting with existing roads in Canada and Alaska".

As there seemed from Mr. Keenleyside's query to be some ambiguity as to whether the word "termini" limited the length of the road to be constructed, or merely described where existing roads, irrespective of their size or carrying capacity, ended, the appropriate minutes of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense were consulted. These contain the following sentence:

"The proposed highway would have its southern terminus on the Edmonton, Dunvegan, British Columbian Railway, which has available carrying capacity substantially in excess of the possible carrying capacity of the road. Its northern terminus would be at a point about sixty miles south of Fairbanks on the Richardson Highway, which connects Fairbanks with Valdes."

In view of the foregoing, which clarifies the intent of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, my Government believes that its offer to undertake the building and wartime maintenance of the highway does in fact include the stretch of road from Dawson Creek to Fort St. John. As a matter of record, it would welcome a confirmation of its belief from the Canadian Government.

Accept [etc.]

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

No. 66

OTTAWA, CANADA,
May 9, 1942.

SIR:

With reference to your note of May 4, 1942, No. 668, regarding the southern terminus of the Alaska Highway, and to our previous exchange of notes regarding the construction of a highway to Alaska, I have the honour to inform you that the Canadian Government is prepared to agree that the stretch of highway between Dawson Creek, British Columbia, and Fort St. John, British Columbia, be included in the proposed

road, and that the railhead at Dawson Creek be accepted as the southern terminus of the highway.

Accept [etc.]

N. A. ROBERTSON

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Agreement With Canada Authorizing the Construction of Flight Strips Along the Highway¹

The following notes were exchanged by the American Minister to Canada and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs:

No. 744

OTTAWA, CANADA,
August 26, 1942.

SIR:

With a view to increasing the value of the Alaska Highway, the American authorities are anxious to undertake the construction of eight flight strips to be located along the road. The tentative sites for these strips are as follows:

- No. 1 At Dawson Creek
- No. 2 About 50 miles south of Ft. Nelson
- No. 3 About 75 miles west of Ft. Nelson
- No. 4 Approximately 40 miles east of Lower Post
- No. 5 Approximately 55 miles west of Lower Post
- No. 6 Approximately 60 miles southeast of Whitehorse
- No. 7 Approximately 30 miles northwest of Whitehorse
- No. 8 About midway between Burwash Landing and Snag

Although the flight strips will in all cases be located along the highway, they will be so placed in direction as to benefit by the prevailing wind.

My Government believes that the construction of these eight flight strips along the highway, which will result in its greater usefulness, falls within the scope and under the terms of the project as agreed to in our exchange of notes

¹ To be printed in the Executive Agreement Series.

of March 17-18, 1942,¹ but inasmuch as mention thereof was not specifically made in the text, it would welcome a confirmation from you of its belief.

Accept [etc.]

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

No. 134

OTTAWA, *September 10, 1942.*

SIR,

In reply to your Note of August 26, 1942, No. 744, I have the honour to inform you that the Canadian Government agrees to the construction of eight flight strips to be located along the route of the Alaska highway at approximately the points mentioned in your Note.

Accept [etc.]

H. H. WRONG

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Agreement With Canada Authorizing the Construction of the Haines-Champagne Highway²

The following notes were exchanged by the American Minister to Canada and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs:

No. 798

OTTAWA, *November 28, 1942.*

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my conversation with Mr. Keenleyside of November 11, 1942, in which, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I requested the approval of the Canadian Government for the construction by appropriate American agencies of the Canadian section of a road from Haines Point, Alaska, to Champagne, Yukon Territory, where it would join the Alaska (Alcan) Highway which is now being constructed according to agreement between our two Governments.

As I pointed out, the construction of this cut-off road would give the United States Army additional facilities for distributing supplies in Yukon and Alaska by truck, and would materially supplement the quantity of freight that

can now be moved into the Whitehorse area over the narrow gauge White Pass and Yukon Railway.

The Canadian Government was good enough to inform me orally on November 19, 1942, that it authorized the construction of that part of the Haines-Champagne road which lies in Canada and I have been directed to express the appreciation of the United States Government for this new mark of Canadian cooperation.

My Government has now instructed me to propose to the Canadian Government that the Haines-Champagne cut-off road shall henceforth be considered an integral part of the Alcan Highway, subject in all applicable respects to the terms of the agreement reached in our exchange of notes of March 17-18, 1942.¹

Accept [etc.]

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

No. 171

OTTAWA, *December 7, 1942.*

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to your note No. 798 of November 28, 1942, in which you propose, on behalf of your Government, that the Haines-Champagne cut-off road shall henceforth be considered an integral part of the Alcan Highway, subject in all applicable respects to the terms of the agreement reached in our exchange of notes of March 17-18, 1942.¹ This proposal appears to be covered by the decision of the War Committee on November 18, 1942, that permission be given to the United States to construct the Highway on the understanding that terms would be worked out between the two countries similar to those in effect for the Alaska Highway.

Accept [etc.]

N. A. ROBERTSON

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Agreement With Canada Regarding the Use of Connecting Roads²

The following notes were exchanged by the American Chargé in Canada and the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs:

¹ Executive Agreement Series 246.

² To be printed in the Executive Agreement Series.

OTTAWA, CANADA, April 10, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. ROBERTSON:

The question has been raised in Washington as to whether the two phrases, found in the American-Canadian exchange of notes of March 17-18, 1942, regarding the post-war use of the Alaska Highway,¹ apply equally to the use of the existing Canadian highways which would have to be used in order to reach the southern terminus of the Alaska Highway from the United States.

You will recall that the notes provide that at the conclusion of the war "that part of the highway which lies in Canada shall become in all respects an integral part of the Canadian highway system, subject to the understanding that there shall at no time be imposed any discriminatory conditions in relation to the use of the road as between Canadian and United States civilian traffic."

Elsewhere the Canadian Government agreed "to waive import duties, transit or similar charges on shipments originating in the United States and to be transported over the highway to Alaska, or originating in Alaska and to be transported over the highway to the United States."

Although it was originally intended that most of the traffic over the Alaska Highway would be routed to Dawson Creek, British Columbia, by rail, it has, as you know, been found expedient to send certain vehicles and transport certain supplies by highway from the United States to Dawson Creek en route to Alaska. My Government feels that it is a natural inference from the language quoted above that United States vehicles should be allowed to use the roads leading from the boundary to the Alaska Highway under conditions similar to those governing the use of the Highway itself.

Sincerely yours,

LEWIS CLARK

*Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*¹ Executive Agreement Series 246.

OTTAWA, April 10, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CLARK:

I have received your letter of April 10th, on the question as to whether the two phrases found in the American-Canadian exchange of notes of March 17-18, 1942, regarding the post-war use of the Alaska Highway,¹ apply equally to the use of the existing Canadian highways which would have to be used in order to reach the southern terminus of the Alaska Highway from the United States.

The notes provide that at the conclusion of the war "that part of the highway which lies in Canada shall become in all respects an integral part of the Canadian highway system, subject to the understanding that there shall at no time be imposed any discriminatory conditions in relation to the use of the road as between Canadian and United States civilian traffic."

Elsewhere in the exchange of notes the Canadian Government agrees "to waive import duties, transit or similar charges on shipments originating in the United States and to be transported over the highway to Alaska, or originating in Alaska and to be transported over the highway to the United States."

You have stated in your letter that although it was originally intended that most of the traffic over the Alaska Highway would be routed to Dawson Creek, British Columbia, by railway, it has been found expedient to send certain vehicles and transport certain supplies by highway from the United States to Dawson Creek en route to Alaska. My Government agrees that it is the natural inference from the language quoted above that United States vehicles should be allowed to use the roads leading from the boundary to the Alaska Highway under conditions and for purposes similar to those governing the use of the highway itself. (It may prove necessary, however, for administrative reasons, to designate certain specific roads to be used in this way. It would not be practicable,

for example, that United States trucks should be able to enter Canada at any point and still receive bonding privileges on the assumption that they intend eventually to proceed along the Alaska Highway to United States territory.)

Yours sincerely,

NORMAN A. ROBERTSON

*Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs*

CUSTOMS PRIVILEGES

Agreement With Canada Regarding Importation Privileges for Government Officials and Employees¹

The following notes were exchanged by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and the American Minister to Canada:

No. 113

OTTAWA, July 21, 1942.

SIR,-

I have the honour to refer to the suggestions made by the Legation some years ago, and renewed in the Legation's Memorandum of December 4, 1941, regarding the granting of the privilege of free import after first arrival to several categories of United States officials in Canada who do not at present receive it.²

2. After careful consideration, the Canadian Government has decided that it would be willing to grant this privilege to Consuls and Vice Consuls of career but not to any other United States officials in Canada who do not at present receive it. The Canadian Government's proposal is, of course, conditional on reciprocity. In view of the fact that Canada does not have any Consuls or Vice Consuls in the United States, and is not likely to have a large number of them for many years, it is desired that the privilege of free import after first arrival be given to Canadian Trade Commissioners and Assistant Trade Commissioners in the United States, as well as to Canadian Consuls and Vice

Consuls of career, if and when any should be appointed.

3. The Canadian Government has also had under consideration another aspect of the Customs Regulations, namely, the right of free entry on first arrival for United States Government employees who are not expressly given that privilege by the Regulations under Tariff Item 706 e.g. clerks of the United States Legation and of Consulates, officers and employees of the United States Customs offices, etc. In practice such persons are given free entry on first arrival by entering them as "Settlers". I understand that in the United States a similar procedure is used to grant free entry on first arrival to non-diplomatic employees of the Canadian Government.

4. We propose that the privilege of free entry on first arrival should be expressly extended to all employees (of United States nationality) of the United States Government sent to posts in Canada and to all employees (of Canadian nationality) of the Canadian Government sent to posts in the United States. This free entry on first arrival should cover private automobiles, but not spirituous liquors.

5. I should be glad to learn whether the proposals set forth above are acceptable to the United States Government. If they are, I should like to know whether your Government desires to have a formal exchange of notes suitable for publication, or whether this Note and your reply will be sufficient.

Accept [etc.]

N. A. ROBERTSON

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

No. 783

OTTAWA, October 29, 1942.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to your note No. 113 of July 21, 1942, regarding the extension of the free importation privilege to American consuls and vice consuls of career on a basis of reciprocity, which would include on the part of Canadians in the United States, trade commissioners and assistant trade commissioners, since

¹ To be printed in the Executive Agreement Series.

² Not printed.

the Canadian Government does not now have consuls or vice consuls in the United States.

It has been noted that the Canadian Government is also willing, on a basis of reciprocity, to affirm its previous practice of granting free entry on first arrival to United States Government employees, other than diplomatic and consular officers, which would include clerks of the United States Legation and Consulates and officers and employees of the United States Customs offices. It has also been noted that the Canadian Government is unwilling to have free entry on first arrival for these employees include spiritous liquors.

I have now been instructed to inform you that my Government is prepared to accord, reciprocally, to Canadian consuls and vice consuls, should such officers be assigned to the United States, and to Canadian trade commissioners and assistant trade commissioners who are Canadian nationals and not engaged in any private occupation for gain, the privilege of importing articles, the importation of which is not prohibited, for their personal use free of duty upon their first arrival, upon their return from leave of absence spent abroad and during the time they are stationed in the United States. Furthermore, my Government is prepared to admit free of duty, on a reciprocal basis, all articles, except spiritous liquors and articles the importation of which is prohibited, imported on first arrival for their personal use by Government employees of Canada other than diplomatic and consular officers, trade commissioners and assistant trade commissioners who are Canadian nationals and not engaged in any private occupation for gain.

I shall appreciate receiving confirmation that the Canadian Government is prepared, reciprocally, to grant the same privileges to like American officers and employees, and, if this be the case, I suggest that this note and your reply thereto be considered as concluding the agreement on this subject between our two Governments, which shall remain in effect until terminated by either Government.

Accept [etc.]

PIERREPONT MOFFAT

No. 155

NOVEMBER 9, 1942.

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to your note No. 783 of October 29, 1942, regarding importation privileges for government officials and employees.

The Canadian Government agrees with the understandings set forth in your note which, with this note, shall be considered as concluding an agreement between our two Governments, which shall remain in effect until terminated by either Government.

Accept [etc.]

LAURENT BEAUDRY

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Agreement With Canada Regarding the Construction and Operation of Radio Broadcasting Stations in Northwestern Canada¹

The following notes were exchanged by the American Chargé in Canada and the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs:

OTTAWA, November 5, 1943.

DEAR MR. ROBERTSON:

I understand that the Northwest Service Command, United States Army, feels a need for small broadcasting stations at several isolated garrisons in the Northwest Command. These stations would be similar to those established at various posts in Alaska and in the United Kingdom which are supplied with non-commercial entertainment program material by the Special Service Division, Army Service Forces.

Although there would be no aspect of competition with the Canadian Broadcasting System due to the isolated locations, a special problem has arisen in complying with Canadian laws and policies. As the stations would be operated by military personnel under the direct control of the local commanding officer, effective supervision of the operation could be exercised only through military channels. In order to ensure

¹ To be printed in the Executive Agreement Series.

compliance with Canadian laws and to assure that the stations would be operated in such a manner as to serve the local populace in strict accordance with the desires of the appropriate Canadian authorities, a proposed draft of authorization which would be issued by the Secretary of War if the Canadian Government were to approve the proposal, is enclosed herewith. I have been directed to bring this matter to your attention with the request that the Canadian Government approve the installations as outlined in the enclosure hereto. At the same time I have been directed to say that any stations placed in operation under the authority, if granted, would be closed at any time on the request of the Canadian Government and, in any event, upon the removal of the garrison or the establishment of regular broadcasting facilities. In addition, the United States War Department has said that it would be immediately responsive to the desires of the Canadian Government in any questions arising out of the operation of the proposed stations.

I understand informally that this desire of the Northwest Service Command has been made known to you through Brigadier General W. W. Foster, and that the War Committee of the Cabinet has approved it in principle. If there is any further information you desire in order to reach a final decision in this matter, I should appreciate being informed.

Yours sincerely,

LEWIS CLARK

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

[Enclosure]

Subject: Military Radio Broadcasting Stations
To: Commanding General
Northwest Service Command
c/o Postmaster
Seattle, Washington.

1. Reference is made to your letter of 28 September 1943, addressed to the Special Service Division, Information Branch, Radio Section, Los Angeles, California, subject: "Military Radio Broadcasting Stations."¹

¹ Not printed.

With the consent and during the pleasure of the Canadian Government, you are authorized to establish armed forces radio broadcasting stations at Whitehorse, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, Simpson, Norman Wells, and Northway.

2. The operation of these radio broadcasting stations will be subject to the following conditions:

(a) All applicable provisions of the Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1936, the Radio Act of 1938, and regulations made thereunder shall be observed.

(b) Program material will be restricted to transcriptions prepared for armed forces of the United Nations by the Special Service Division, Army Service Forces, local talent programs of a strictly entertainment character, and such Canadian programs as may be made available by Canadian Government agencies.

(c) Every assistance will be rendered Canadian Government authorities in the provision of wire circuits and other facilities which may be required for the delivery of news or other programs desired by them.

(d) A diligent and continuing survey of public reaction to programs will be maintained to the end that no criticism of any character will be permitted to develop.

(e) The local commanding officer will be held strictly accountable for the exercise of good taste and propriety in the selection of program material and for the complete avoidance of commercialism, sectarianism, and editorializing on political or controversial subjects.

3. Technical details such as power and the choice of frequency, etc. will be arranged through the direct channel established between the Controller of Radio, Ministry of Transport and the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in the same manner as for all other Army radio facilities in Canada.

By order of the Secretary of War:

OTTAWA, November 25, 1943.

DEAR MR. ATHERTON:

I should like to refer to Mr. Clark's letter of November 5, 1943, in which permission is requested by the United States Government to construct and operate certain radio broadcasting stations in Northwestern Canada.

I am pleased to inform you that the Canadian Government agrees to the construction and operation, by the Government of the United States, of radio broadcasting stations at Whitehorse, Watson Lake, Fort Nelson, Simpson and Norman Wells, subject to the following conditions:

- (1) that the stations will be operated directly by the United States Government, and for the sole purpose of bringing entertainment and information to United States and Canadian military and civilian personnel;
- (2) that the radio stations will be subject to the provisions of the Canadian Broadcasting Act, 1936, the Radio Act, 1938, the Regulations made under these Acts, and to all other applicable laws and regulations in force in Canada; provided that no fee or tax shall be paid by the United States Government to the Canadian Government in connection with the operation of these stations;
- (3) that each station will be operated in accordance with the terms of an annual renewable permit to be issued by the Department of Transport;
- (4) that authorization for the operation by the United States Government of the stations may be cancelled at any time by the Canadian Government, and in any case such authorization for operation shall cease with the termination of the war;
- (5) that the stations may be used for the broadcasting of Canadian programmes and in particular of Canadian news programmes, it being understood that the amount of time to be set aside for Canadian programmes will be subject to agreement between the Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in the Northwest, and the Commanding Officer of the United States Northwest Service Command;
- (6) that the United States Government will make available to the Canadian Government its wire services for the transmission of Canadian news and Canadian programmes to the stations;
- (7) that the sites, frequencies, power, call letters and other technical details concerning the stations shall be subject to the approval of the Department of Trans-

port and shall be arranged directly through the channel already established between the Controller of Radio of the Department of Transport, Ottawa, and the office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, in the same manner as for all other radio facilities of the United States Armed Forces in Canada. Any or all necessary changes in the foregoing particulars shall be dealt with through the same channel;

- (8) that the stations will be dealt with after the war in accordance with the exchange of notes of January 27, 1943, between Canada and the United States, covering post-war disposition of United States defence facilities in Canada.¹
- (9) that any land or leasehold required by the United States Government as sites for the stations shall be acquired by the Canadian Government in its name, and shall be made available to the United States Government without charge.

I trust that the foregoing arrangements will be acceptable to the United States Government.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON
*Under Secretary of State
 for External Affairs*

OTTAWA, January 17, 1944.

DEAR MR. ROBERTSON:

Your letter of November 25, 1943 granting, under certain conditions, our request to construct and operate radio broadcasting stations in Northwestern Canada was forwarded immediately to Washington.

We have now been authorized to say that the stipulations made by the Canadian Government are acceptable to the United States War Department.

Yours sincerely,

LEWIS CLARK

¹ Not printed.

WATER POWER

Agreement With Canada for the Temporary Raising of the Level of Lake St. Francis

By an exchange of notes dated October 5 and 9, 1943, the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada agreed to continue in force until October 1, 1944, the agreement of November 10, 1941 for the temporary raising of the level of Lake St. Francis during low water periods.

The agreement of November 10, 1941, which was to remain in force until October 1, 1942 and was continued in force until October 1, 1943 by an exchange of notes dated October 5 and 9, 1942, was concluded for the purpose of conserving the supply of power in the lower St. Lawrence.¹

The exchange of notes dated October 5 and 9, 1943 will be printed in the Executive Agreement Series.

Legislation

An Act To amend the Nationality Act of 1940. Approved January 20, 1944. [H. R. 2207.] Public Law 221, 78th Cong. 2 pp.

Retirement and Disability Fund, Foreign Service: Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report by the Secretary of State, showing all receipts and disbursements on account of refunds, allowances, and annuities for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1943, in connection with the Foreign Service retirement and disability system. H. Doc. 383, 78th Cong. 6 pp.

¹ Executive Agreement Series 291.

Supplemental Estimate of Appropriation, Department of State, 1945: Communication from the President of the United States transmitting supplemental estimate of appropriation, in the amount of \$1,618,000, for the Department of State, for the fiscal year 1945, in the form of an amendment to the Budget for the said fiscal year. H. Doc. 388, 78th Cong. 2 pp.

Creating a Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning. H. Rept. 1021, 78th Cong., on H. Res. 408. [Favorable report.] 1 p.

Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1945. H. Rept. 1023, 78th Cong., on H. R. 4070. [Foreign Service Pay Adjustment, p. 8; Inter-American Highway, p. 15.] 27 pp.

To Assist in Relieving Economic Distress in the Virgin Islands: Hearings before the Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 981 and H.R. 3777. October 21 and 27; November 2, 10, and 17; December 2 and 6, 1943. Part 3, Virgin Islands. 149 pp.

Publications

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Publications of the Department of State (a list cumulative from October 1, 1929). January 1, 1944. Publication 2045. iv, 27 pp. Free.

Health and Sanitation Program: Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Mexico City June 30 and July 1, 1943. Executive Agreement Series 347. Publication 2049. 5 pp. 5¢.

Purchase by the United States of Exportable Surpluses of Dominican Rice, Corn, and Peanut Meal: Agreement Between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic Approving Memorandum of Understanding Dated May 20, 1943—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Ciudad Trujillo June 10, 1943. Executive Agreement Series 350. Publication 2050. 11 pp. 5¢.